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Can neoliberal small state theory explain de facto state behaviour? The case study 
of Abkhazia’s financial foreign policy towards Russia since 2008. 
 
Introduction: 
The dissolution of both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1990s led to the 
emergence of many political entities that go against the traditional norms of Westphalian 
sovereignty. While the breakup of Yugoslavia brought about many short-lived de facto states 
such as Republica Srpska; others such as Bosnia and Serbia are now officially recognised as 
UN member states. Similarly, the breakup of the Soviet Union did not only produce fully-
fledged but also de facto states such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria who still fail 
to receive international recognition. 
Florea (2014) was the first scholar to offer a detailed conceptualisation of these political 
entities: De facto states are polities that are officially claimed by a de jure state they seek 
independence from; the de facto state leaders exert the full power monopoly within that area 
and provide its citizen with social and political order (Florea 2014:791). Moreover, de facto 
states have not been recognised by a simple majority of UN Security Council members and 
have existed for more than two years (ibid.:792). With this, Florea allows us to clearly 
distinguish de facto states from territories controlled by rebel groups or very short-lived state-
like structures resulting from civil war. The recognition of de facto states is highly disputed and 
highly politicised: The United Nations refrains from official recognition as this would violate 
the norm of state sovereignty (of the state they are de jure part of) (Fabry 2012:663). Moreover, 
UN member states fear that secessionist minorities in their own or other states might feel 
encouraged if they recognised a newly seceded entity (Ryngaert and Sobrie 2011:480). 
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Abkhazia, a de facto state situated in the Southern Caucasus, has also failed to gain 
international recognition albeit its period of de facto independence from Georgia of nearly three 
decades (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2012:281). Abkhazia, populated by the ethnic Abkhaz, had 
been an autonomous republic in the USSR since 1920 (Cornell 2001:262). In 1931, however, 
the region was integrated into the Georgian Union Republic and thus integrated into the 
Republic of Georgia after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2008:485). 
In 1992, Georgia cut Abkhazia’s autonomous status through a change in constitution; as a result, 
Abkhazia proclaimed its independence from Georgia in July of the same year (ibid.). After the 
subsequent Abkhaz-Georgian war between 1992 and 1993, Russia (under a Commonwealth of 
Independent States mandate) had stationed a peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia to keep 
Georgian troops from reclaiming the territory (Ryngaert and Sobrie 2011:481). This 
peacekeeping mission was terminated by the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, caused by a violent 
attack by Georgian troops in South Ossetia’s capital which resulted in the death of Russian 
peacekeeping personnel (ibid). Abkhazia quickly became the second front of this war, which 
led to Russia’s decision to officially recognise Abkhazia’s independence as a state separate 
from Georgia (ibid.). 
Since 2008, Russia has been the only UN Security Council member state who has 
officially recognised Abkhazia as a de jure state (Girardin et al 2015:538). Moreover, Russia 
still supports Abkhazia financially and militarily to guarantee its de facto separation from 
Georgia (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2012:282) – now not under a peacekeeping mandate, but under 
an officially established diplomatic relations with Abkhazia. However, in 2009, the Abkhazian 
president Bagapsh stressed that his government was determined to make Abkhazia a “legal and 
democratic state” independent from Russia (Sputniknews 2009). Since then, Abkhazians are 
committed to “keep[ing] Russia at arm’s length even if it means missing out on economic 
development” (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2012:291) to ensure the best protection of their de facto 
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sovereignty. Decreasing Russia’s influence can be seen as crucial for the strengthening of 
Abkhazia’s statehood, and to avoid becoming a mere Russian protectorate: At the time of the 
establishment of the diplomatic relationship in 2008, Russia accounted for 99% of Abkhazia’s 
overall foreign trade (ICG 2010:6). Thus, increasing economic and overall independence has 
become a sine qua non for Abkhazia’s sovereignty. 
Thus, this dissertation will assess whether Abkhazia could execute its wish for greater 
independence. Neoliberal small state theory (NSST) emphasises that even small states have 
sufficient foreign policy-making capabilities to steer political developments in a certain 
direction. In particular, the approach claims that domestic factors such as individual leaders, 
economic resources and diplomatic skills determine small state foreign policy-making. Thus, 
NSST would predict that Abkhazia, albeit possessing smaller power capabilities than Russia, 
can still determine its economic foreign policy towards Moscow if these domestic factors are 
given. Thus, the question this research will seek to answer is: Can neoliberal small state theory 
explain Abkhazia’s financial foreign policy towards Russia since 2008? This paper 
hypothesises that if Abkhazia was successful in strengthening its independence from Russia, 
this will be observable through diminished aid allocation dependency and diversified foreign 
trade.  The analysis will be conducted through a theory-testing, qualitative analysis; the method 
used will be process tracing to test the hypothesis formulated.  
The main contribution of this research lies in the application of the neoliberal approach 
within small state theory onto a new field of actors, de facto states, thus advancing the academic 
debate. In addition, the research hopes to contribute to the research on neoliberal small state 
theory, as this research aims at uncovering whether NSST is an appropriate explanatory 
framework for the case study of Abkhazia. Accordingly, if the research question is affirmed, 
this strengthens the neoliberal approach within small states theory. If the research question is 
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negated, on the other hand, this can pave the way towards further research on classical small 
state theory as potential explanatory mechanism for the study on de facto states. 
 
Literature Review: 
De facto states are highly disputed actors in international politics. The disputed nature 
of those political units is reflected in the disputed terminology used to describe such entities: 
The terms range from ‘quasi-states’ (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2008) to ‘unrecognised states’ 
(Souleimanov et al 2017) to ‘pseudo states’ (Kolossov and O’Loughlin 1999). The 
terminological dispute stems from some authors opposing the ‘de facto’ nomenclature, as the 
lack of international recognition does not equate those entities sufficiently to a state 
(cf.Yemelianova 2015:221). However, the terminological disputes merely concern the semantic 
“edges of the definition, while not disputing the basic elements of it” (Pegg 1998:1). Thus, most 
scholars would agree with Florea’s (2014) conceptualisation of de facto states but might 
disagree with the terminology. 
This paper will employ the term de facto states for three reasons: Firstly, the term de 
facto states best reflects that Abkhazia possesses a state-like character apart from international 
recognition as a de jure state. The Convention on the Rights and Duties of States defines a state 
as a political entity with “a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity 
to enter into relations with other states” (SICOAS 1933: Article 1). While Abkhazia arguably 
meets all criteria, the international community does not recognise Abkhazia as a state, claiming 
that its recognition would disrupt the “national unity” of Georgia, thus violating the UN Charter 
(Fabry 2012:663). Secondly, the term ‘de facto state’ underlines the fact that notwithstanding 
the lack of international recognition, Abkhazia has succeeded in upholding both internal 
institutional stability and political autonomy from Georgia (Kopeček et al. 2016:86). Lastly, for 
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the Southern Caucasus, the term ‘de facto states’ is generally the commonly agreed upon 
terminology (cf. Berg and Toomla 2009; Florea 2014; Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2012). Academic 
literature on de facto states can be roughly divided into two camps: Studies concerned with the 
external dimension (such as relations with other states) of the facto states, and studies concerned 
with the internal dynamics (such as political institution-building efforts). 
Within the first camp, scholars have sought to analyse what role international law and 
state recognition play for de facto states. Within this debate, authors analyse how the process 
of official recognition by the international community has evolved and became more difficult 
to achieve (Ryngaert and Sobrie 2011). Based on this, Berg and Toomla (2009) construct a 
“normalisation index” which ranks the world’s current de facto states into the categories of 
negation, boycott, toleration or quasi-recognition. They found that no de facto state is receiving 
complete negation by the international society; instead, most de facto states can be classified as 
boycotted (Abkhazia, Transnistria, Somaliland and Nagorno-Karabakh), only Northern Cyprus 
could be classified as tolerated, and Taiwan and Kosovo as quasi-recognised, thus receiving the 
highest amount of international recognition (Berg and Toomla 2009:43). 
Alternatively, scholars have sought to assess which factors are responsible for the 
survival or the failure of de facto states. Kolstø and Paukovic (2014), through their study of the 
failed de facto Serb Republic of Krajina, have identified that the necessary conditions for de 
facto state survival: Commitment to nation-building, measures to develop a functioning 
political apparatus, as well as the support of a patron state. The Republic of Krajina perished as 
it had neither (ibid.). Similarly, Aliyev and Souleimanov (2017), in their study of the failed 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, conclude that the lack of a patron state combined with economic 
dependency, ideological fractionalisation between clans, and warlord politics led to the collapse 
of the de facto state. For Abkhazia, predictive case studies have been conducted which concern 
themselves with the question of whether Abkhazia will survive or perish as an independent unit 
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from Georgia. Caspersen (2009), for instance, argues that the international isolation will 
eventually force Abkhazia to give up some of its independence, potentially reuniting with its 
parent state Georgia. This position, however, has been criticised by scholars that observe a 
genuine commitment to state independence within Abkhazia which will not be satisfied by 
solutions entailing the reintegration into Georgia (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2012:291). 
Secondly, another academic subfield concerning itself with the external dimension of 
states analyses the role patron states play for de facto states. Caspersen and Stanfield (2011) 
argue that one commonality can be found in all patron-and-de-facto-state relations: While 
upholding good relations with the patron states is imperative for de facto states, all de facto 
states are also mainly interested in pursuing their own policy agenda, which sometimes causes 
a conflict in interests (Caspersen and Stanfield 2011:137). However, literature on the 
relationship between Abkhazia and its patron state Russia mainly focuses on the Russian 
perspective, focusing on its foreign policy shift in the ‘near abroad’ since the mid-2000: 
Scholars such as Karagiannis noticed a greater military involvement in the former Soviet 
republics and a mismatch between Russia’s rhetoric of its responsibility to protect all ethnic 
Russians and its actual intention of preventing that former Soviet republics gain membership in 
the U.S.-dominated NATO (Karagiannis 2014:416). With this, scholars argue, Russia is 
successfully avoiding NATO military presence at its borders by actively supporting anti-
Western regimes and stationing Russian troops in breakaway regions (Abushov 2009:204; 
Tolstrup 2009:940 Souleimanov et al. 2017:6). Accordingly, some authors conclude that most 
de facto states are too unstable and too dependent on their patron state to be considered 
important actors in world politics (Caspersen 2009; Comai 2017). However, the academic 
debate on Abkhazia differs slightly from the common academic consensus. Due to its 
particularly strong internal political stability and state-like characteristics, most scholars 
nowadays disagree with the definition of Abkhazia as a mere “puppet state” to Moscow 
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(Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2012:291; Frear 2014:89; Souleimanov et al. 2017:1). These authors 
can be situated within the second subfield of academic literature, shifting their focus towards 
an internal analysis of de facto states. 
This internal camp of de facto state literature assesses the process of nation- and state-
building of these political entities. Nation-building is defined as the more identity-based aspect 
of state-building mainly focused on creating a shared identity, a shared narrative and 
interpretation of history (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2008:484; Pegg 2017). Identity, in this regard, 
is seen as the individual’s sense of belonging to a group, be it ethnic or (sub-)national (Tajfel 
1982). Thus, scholars have attempted to gather primary data to assess whether a shared identity 
was created between the multiple ethnic identities which cohabit in many de facto states. 
Notably, O’Loughlin, Kolossov and Toal have conducted extensive random interviews in both 
Abkhazia and Transnistria. For Transnistria, the authors observe a rather homogenous identity 
with similar opinions between ethnic Moldovans, ethnic Armenians and ethnic Russians 
(O’Loughlin et al. 2014). In Abkhazia, ethnic Abkhaz, as well as ethnic Armenians and 
Russians, have displayed a shared set of beliefs, while ethnic Georgians and Migrelians living 
on Abkhaz territory had diverging views on many of the questions asked by the authors related 
to Abkhazia’s past and future outlook (O’Loughlin et al. 2011). Pegg and Kolstø have observed 
similar opinion disparities within Somaliland, but along tribal instead of ethnic cleavages (Pegg 
and Kolstø 2015). 
Based on this internal approach to the study of de facto states, this research was inspired 
to focus on a more domestic explanation of de facto state foreign policy. To do so, this research 
employs a theory that has previously only been applied to (small) de jure states: small states 
theory (employed by foreign policy scholars such as Braveboy-Wagner 2010; Lamoreux and 
Galbreath 2008; Shaohua 2015). This theory will help assess Abkhazia has succeeded to fulfil 
its foreign policy preferences by looking at domestic variables. 
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Theory: 
Small state theory focuses on the question of whether small states – usually defined as 
states with a small size and small power capability (Elman 1995:171) – have any influence on 
international politics. Two factors have inspired the use of the small state theory framework 
onto a de facto state case study: First, Abkhazia can be defined as ‘small’ in both size and 
military capabilities: Abkhazia has a geographical size of 8,660 km², a population size of about 
240,000 as of 2011 (Frear 2014:2) and a military capability of 20,000 troops (Coggins 
2014:177). This fact invites for the testing of an already present theory of similar political units 
– neoliberal small state theory (NSST) – determining whether it is expandable to the de facto 
state Abkhazia. In addition, the fact that Abkhazia possesses all relevant state-like capabilities 
described by Florea (2014) (such as democratic elections and stable institutions) makes it 
possible to equate Abkhazia to a state for the purpose of analysis.1 Thus, the application of 
small state theory is deemed appropriate. The academic literature can be divided into two 
distinct approaches: Those emphasizing the dominance of systemic constraints, and approaches 
focusing on the power of domestic determinants of foreign policy.  
The first approach builds on insights from classical realism which claims that small 
states cannot shape foreign policy; instead, their policy options are constrained by the fact that 
greater powers determine the course of action in world politics. Walt (1985), for instance, 
argues that the only two foreign policy options that small states have are bandwagoning or 
balancing. Bandwagoning refers to the situation in which a state commits to an alliance with a 
threatening, greater power to avoid being attacked (Mearsheimer 2014[2001]:139). Balancing 
– the formation of an alliance against a threatening country – is only an option for small states 
                                                          
1 This paper recognizes that de facto states are, by nature, a highly politicised issue. Treating Abkhazia as a state 
for the purpose of this paper has no underlying normative message. Rather, the analysis shall be seen as a purely 
theoretical contribution to the academic debate. 
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when the threat comes from another small state (Walt 1985:17). This realist approach within 
small state theory assumes that domestic variables such as state preferences can only be realised 
in the foreign policy-making of great powers, as small powers have a “smaller margin of error” 
with their limited military capabilities and their higher vulnerability (Handel 1990[1981]:3). 
Thus, this approach argues, joining coalitions with great powers is the only possibility for small 
states to guarantee their survival (Vital 1971:124). 
The second approach within small state theory, the neoliberal approach, claims that 
small states have more foreign policy capabilities and more options than simply reacting to 
pressures from great powers. This approach does not deny that it is nearly impossible for small 
states to exercise power at the systemic level; however, the approach emphasises that small 
states can wield considerable influence in certain geopolitical areas. Braveboy-Wagner, for 
instance, argues that strong internal economic capabilities such as valuable resources and 
technological know-how can empower small states to steer their foreign policy according to 
their preferences (Braveboy-Wagner 2010:408). Moreover, the skill of building diplomatic 
relationships strategically – the so-called ‘smart’ power – can empower small states 
considerably: By seeking relations with other states, small states can exert normative influence 
and achieve their policy goals (ibid:424–425). Similarly, Lamoreux and Galbreath, for their 
study of the Baltic States, conclude that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania possess sufficient power 
to shape international politics due to their membership in the European Union and NATO 
(Lamoreux and Galbreath 2008). Similarly, Shaohua (2015) in her study on the small state 
Taiwan concludes that its coalition with 23 other small states has successfully protected Taiwan 
from the foreign policy power of China. This approach rejects the notion that small powers have 
to align with great powers and that great powers always determine the course of action. Instead, 
the approach argues that small states can wield influence through soft-power mechanisms such 
as ideology, coalitions with other small states or by leading roles in big international 
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organisations (Shaohua 2015:23; Chong and Maass 2010:381). Moreover, foreign policy-
makers of small states, arguably, have greater freedom in their foreign policy-making as their 
smallness of the state usually entails simpler decision-making structures (Shaohua 2015:23). 
Thus, as leaders have greater decisive power in smaller states than in greater (democratic) states, 
they can influence foreign policy more easily and efficiently. Fredrick Doeser (2013), in his 
work on “leadership-driven change” notes that Denmark only changed its foreign policy 
towards a more active and U.S.-friendly one after Denmark’s foreign minister decided on 
Denmark’s active involvement in the Gulf War. This approach assumes that under certain 
systemic or domestic conditions which create a window of opportunity, leaders can take 
advantage of the situation to stir their country’s foreign policy into a certain direction (Doeser 
2013:583). These conditions creating a window of opportunity are in accordance with 
Braveboy-Wagner’s aforementioned factors boosting a small state’s power capabilities 
(internal economic capabilities such as resources, know-how, and the strategic skill to build 
trade and diplomatic relationships) (Braveboy-Wagner 2010:408ff.). Thus, if a window of 
opportunity presents itself, the foreign policy change can be initiated by a country’s foreign 
policy-maker, but its long-term implementation can depend upon the political preferences of 
future political leaders or the public opinion (Doeser 2013:583). Similarly, Gustavsson (1999) 
concludes his study on Sweden’s decision to join the European Community with the statement 
that a change in foreign policy is caused by a change in the beliefs or perceptions by a country’s 
decision-makers. In summary, NSST does thus believe that domestic factors such as a country’s 
leadership, the public opinion or the local economy can empower small states to steer their 
foreign policy according to their preferences. 
The only attempt in academic literature to theorise Abkhazia as a small state for the 
purpose of small state theory was undertaken by Thomas Frear (2014). While mentioning small 
states theory in his work, Frear fails to mention that there are two distinct approaches within it 
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and does not make clear which approach he is considering in his analysis, if at all. He concludes 
his research by assessing that Russia’s involvement with Abkhazia increases at the same time 
as Russo-Georgian relations deteriorate (Frear 2014:5). With this, he mainly contributes to the 
literature on Russia’s foreign policy rather than on Abkhazia’s foreign policy. Moreover, he 
fails to analyse whether Abkhazia has partaken in small-state theory strategies. Thus, this 
research aims at providing an appropriate small state theory analysis by testing NSST. This 
analysis will focus on the aforementioned NSST approaches by Braveboy-Wagner (2010) and 
Doeser (2013), stating that domestic factors can empower small states to pursue their foreign 
policy preferences. Thus, a state’s economic and strategic capabilities – either on their own or 
combined with a leader’s efforts to change the course of foreign policy – will be seen as factors 
empowering small states to change their policies. Accordingly, these factors will form the basis 
of the analysis. 
The willingness of Abkhazia to shift its foreign policy towards greater independence 
from Russia invites for the application of this second, neoliberal approach. As previously 
mentioned, Russian aid accounted for nearly the entirety of Abkhazia’s state budget in 2008 
(ICG 2010:6). NSST would predict that Abkhazia, albeit possessing smaller economic 
capabilities, was still able to execute a more independent economic foreign policy towards 
Moscow. Thus, the hypothesis tested is the following: 
Abkhazia has implemented its preference for greater independence through a 
decreasing amount of financial aid that it is accepting from Moscow and through 
diversified revenue sources since 2008. 
If the hypothesis is found valid, NSST is affirmed as an explanatory mechanism for the case 
study of Abkhazia. This will pave the way towards future research on whether other de facto 
case studies can be explained by this small state theory approach. If the hypothesis is rejected 
in the analysis, NSST can be ruled out as an explanatory mechanism for this case study. 
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Research Design: 
This research will be conducted through a theory-testing single case study design. A 
single case study allows for a thorough assessment of whether NSST is an appropriate 
framework for this analysis. Abkhazia, as a single case study, was chosen as its unique 
commitment to independence and its strong internal political stability suggest that Abkhazia 
might, indeed, be closer to what we define as an independent state than many other de facto 
states. In comparison to other de facto states such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia is said to show a 
considerably lower degree of Russian influence (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2012:284). This is 
indicated, for instance, by the fact that it seems to have a particularly strong commitment to 
democracy: In 2009, Freedom House rated Abkhazia as ‘partly free’, thus scoring higher than 
both Georgia and Russia (Freedom House 2009a). South Ossetia, on the other hand, is 
consistently considered ‘not free’ (Freedom House 2009b). Relatedly, both democratic 
development and independence were demonstrated in the 2004 presidential elections when 
Abkhazians cast a protest vote against Raul Khajimba, the presidential candidate backed by 
Moscow. Instead, Abkhazians elected Bagapsh, married to a Georgian wife, and former Abkhaz 
representative in the Georgian government prior to the war (O’Loughlin et al. 2011:20). The 
Abkhazian democracy was therefore sufficiently free from Russian interference to be able to 
elect a Georgia-friendly and reject a Moscow-friendly candidate. After the election result was 
announced, Russia threatened to close the borders and demanded new elections; nonetheless, 
Bagapsh was proclaimed president (Popescu 2006:15). These developments suggest that 
domestic preferences within Abkhazia might have a greater influence than conventional, 
systemic small state theory wisdom would suggest. Therefore, the domestic, neoliberal small 
state theory will be considered and tested for this case study. 
This qualitative hypothesis-testing analysis will employ Collier’s (2011) and Beach and 
Pedersen’s (2013) methodology of deductive process tracing. Process-tracing is the most 
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adequate method to assess whether a causal mechanism is given between variables within a 
single case study, thus enabling the researcher to test theories or hypotheses (Beach and 
Pederson 2013:69). Moreover, process-tracing allows for the most detailed capturing of 
developments over time by breaking a causal mechanism into individual components (Beach 
2017). Thus, process tracing lends itself as the most appropriate tool to test the developments 
of Abkhazia’s foreign policy over time. Process-tracing, in this instance, will be defined as the 
testing of the causal chain between changes in a domestic factor and a policy-outcome (Ulriksen 
and Dadalauri 2016:226) – Abkhazia’s preference for greater independence and the actual 
foreign policy, respectively. Thus, the independent variable is Abkhazia’s change of foreign 
policy preference, while the dependent variable is Abkhazia’s more independent economic 
foreign policy towards Russia. This analysis will focus on the economic foreign policy due to 
its indicative power of Abkhazia’s state independence: If Abkhazia – notwithstanding its 
complete economic reliance on Russia in 2008 – was able to increase its economic 
independence, then this shows that small states have greater capabilities than the realist dictum 
suggests. 
This process-tracing analysis will be conducted in two steps: Firstly, the establishment 
of a descriptive inference of the dependent variable (i.e. the testing of the hypothesis). Secondly, 
the establishment of a timeline of the change to assess the causal mechanism behind this change. 
These two steps are further explained in the next paragraph before moving onto the analysis. 
The main period considered by this analysis is 2008 until 2018, thus spanning a decade from 
the point of Russia’s recognition to offer a thorough analysis. 
 
Step 1: Descriptive inference – testing the hypothesis: 
To test the hypothesis, it is important to establish what the economic situation of 
Abkhazia was prior to 2008 prior to further analysis. This will help capture the economic 
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direction Abkhazia was headed prior to the publicly declared decision to increase its financial 
independence. Thus, the first part of the descriptive analysis section will briefly assess 
Abkhazia’s economic situation between the war in 1993 and 2008. This time period will provide 
an appropriate counterpart to the assessed decade of 2008 – 2018.  Subsequently, the analysis 
will turn to the descriptive inference analysis of the period post-2008. The previously stated 
hypothesis will be tested and thus either verified or discarded. 
Collier’s work assumes that descriptive inference must be established before a causal 
inference is possible (Collier 2011:824). Accordingly, the crucial task of this research will be 
to verify that a more independent foreign policy towards Russia post-2008 was, indeed, 
implemented. In this “causal process observation”, case-specific knowledge will have to be 
collected through a multitude of sources (Beach and Pedersen 2013:73). Thus, as much 
evidence as possible on Abkhazia’s economic development will be collected to assess whether 
a change in financial foreign policy has occurred. To test the hypothesis, Russia’s aid 
allocations to Abkhazia and Abkhazia’s foreign trade revenues, in particular, will be looked at. 
Accordingly, the analysis will assess whether the amount of Russia’s financial aid to Abkhazia 
has decreased since 2008, both absolutely and in relation to Abkhazia’s state budget. Secondly, 
Abkhazia’s foreign trade revenues, i.e. import and export revenue developments, will be 
assessed. Most importantly, the research will assess whether Abkhazia has conducted trade with 
Russia exclusively or if the de facto state has succeeded in diversifying its source of revenues. 
 
Step 2: Causal inference - assessing the process timeline  
            After a change in financial foreign policy has been identified, the research will have to 
assess the causal process through a timeline. The descriptive inference from the previous 
analysis step will allow for the identification of crucial points of policy change since 2008. With 
process-tracing, these points of change will be assessed and causally attributed to events prior 
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to this development. As this analysis rests on assumptions from neoliberal small state theory, 
the causal inference analysis will test the predictions of NSST. In particular, the causal inference 
analysis will test two main domestic factors that are attributed foreign policy change capability 
within NSST: Firstly, NSST as interpreted by Braveboy-Wagner, which states that small states 
can exercise power mainly through economic means or diplomatic ‘smart’ power (2010:409). 
Secondly, NSST as interpreted by Doeser, who claims that the domestic factors introduced by 
Braveboy-Wagner change the course of foreign policy-making, but only if this change is 
initiated by the country’s leadership (Doeser 2013:583). Thus, the timeline analysis of the 
financial foreign policy developments will be concerned with unveiling which domestic factors 
(leadership or domestic factors) have caused change. 
Before conducting the analysis, a particular aspect regarding the data analysis ought to 
be discussed: The collection of data for this case study is characterised by certain problems 
which are recurrent in the study of de facto states. Data for many de facto states is limited, thus, 
to circumvent the problem of making inferences with biased data, fieldwork in the country is 
the only way to verify secondary data or reports made by third parties. However, as primary 
data collection through fieldwork was not possible in this case, the author has sought to 
minimise any bias or inaccuracy of data through specific measures: Much of the analysis rests 
on economic data which was retrieved either from official Abkhaz’ government websites or 
Abkhazia’s state press agency Apsnypress (Апсныпресс). This data is expected to be 
reasonably reliable due to a phenomenon commonly observed for data published by de facto 
states: Many de facto states hope that by publishing transparent, accurate data they can 
demonstrate their commitment towards democratisation, thus increasing the chances of 
international recognition through the pursuit of “earned sovereignty” (Pegg 2017:10). 
Notwithstanding, the accuracy of the data will be further guaranteed by contrasting it with 
academic literature on Abkhazia, particularly research based on public and civil society opinion 
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fieldwork conducted by authors in Abkhazia (cf. O’Loughlin et al. 2011; Hoch, Kopeček and 
Baar 2017; Oltramonti 2015). This academic research is particularly insightful due to the fact 
that the authors conducted extensive, random interviews with both the general public as well 
the most important non-state actors within Abkhazia. Other data to back this analysis are reports 
on Abkhaz-Georgian and Abkhaz-Russian relations by the renowned international NGOs the 
International Crisis Group and Freedom House, whose data are deemed reliable and therefore 
used by many institutions or governments.2 Moreover, several news channels were employed: 
On the one hand, the analysis relies greatly on the news outlet Abkhaz World which was selected 
by the author as it is committed to providing neutral and trustworthy information about 
Abkhazia in English3. Other auxiliary data elements include news reports about current affairs 
in Abkhazia from media channels such the Caucasian media channel Ekhokavkaza (Эхо 
Кавказа) by Radio Free Europe, a not-for-profit news outlet funded by the U.S. Congress, or 
the Georgian news channel Georgia Today. Insights by Georgia-affiliated news outlets will 
help to contrast the given information with the information proliferated by the parent state 
Georgia. Moreover, if Abkhazia was debated in international media, the news sources include 
the international news outlets The New York Times or The Guardian to provide the international 
community’s perspective. 
 
  
                                                          
2 For more information on the rigorous and professional data collection process by the two NGOs, refer to 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2016-methodology and https://www.crisisgroup.org/how-we-
work/methodology respectively 
3 Abkhaz World’s mission is to prove an authentic insight into Abkhaz public opinion and to translate official 
information on Abkhazia previously only available in Russian or Abkhazian; cf. 
http://abkhazworld.com/aw/about  
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Analysis: 
Step 1: Descriptive inference 
 
Background: Abkhazia’s war legacy –  the years leading up to 2008 
Data on Abkhazia’s economy between its de facto independence from Georgia in 1993 
and Russia’s recognition in 2008 is scarce. Therefore, to bridge this information gap, Oltramonti 
(2015) conducted an extensive analysis of Abkhazia’s economy during this time through 52 
semi-structured interviews and fieldwork in Abkhazia. She concludes that albeit the Abkhaz 
economy suffered significantly from the war, “it would be mistaken to assume that [the 
government’s] economic activity came to an absolute standstill” (ibid.). Instead, it was a 
combination of the efforts of external actors and internal stakeholders that characterises this 
time period: 
In 1998 and 1999, the Abkhaz’ economy experienced deep contractions as it suffered 
severely from sanctions imposed by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an 
embargo imposed by Georgia and only started its transition towards a market economy in 1998 
(Oltramonti 2015:293-296). However, those sanctions created economic opportunities within 
Abkhazia: The dent in the urban economies, which had been caused by people fleeing the 
country during the war, was filled by Abkhazians who relocated into the west of the country 
and into the capital city Sukhum (Oltramonti 2015:293). A “ruralisation of urban centres” 
followed: Abkhazia’s agriculture did not collapse but instead was relocated to urban areas 
(ibid.). Moreover, Abkhazia’s government established trade relationships with Georgian border 
regions and the Turkish diaspora, exporting metal, cigarettes, petrol, timber and foodstuffs 
(ibid.). While this prevented complete economic collapse, the economic sanctions still had a 
toll on Abkhazia, for instance through preventing it from receiving post-war rehabilitation aid 
from external donors: As aid could only flow through the official channel of a de jure state, 
most countries donated aid directly to Georgia (Francis 2011:240). 
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Since those sanctions were lifted in 1999, international donors were allowed to enter the 
country, contributing to Abkhazia’s steady recovery. The European Commission’s department 
for humanitarian aid and civil protection (ECHO) conducted food security and shelter 
rehabilitation programmes until 2007 in the Abkhaz region (ECHO 2016). This aid programme 
of 99 million euros was allocated to Georgia, the Abkhaz region and South Ossetia, enabling 
the reconstruction of homes destroyed by the war and providing food security to inhabitants 
until all regions were self-sustaining (ibid:3; Francis 2011:274). Moreover, in 2004, the 
European Commission allocated 10 million euros to the rebuilding of Abkhazia’s main 
hydroelectric power plant (ICG 2006:17). While the economic consequences of these measures 
are difficult to observe for a lack of (Abkhazian / Georgian subnational) data for the respective 
years, they are—to some extent—indicated by the fact that Abkhazia’s government revenue 
doubled between 2004 and 2007 (Coggins 2014:178; Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2008:493). In 
2004, Abkhazia’s had a government revenue of 709 million roubles; while in 2007, this had 
nearly doubled to 1,200 million roubles (ICG 2006:16). 
This speedy recovery was favoured by two main traits of Abkhazia’s socio-economic 
structure: Firstly, Abkhazia’s mild climate and fertile grounds have made Abkhazia a self-
sustaining piece of land in terms of food since long before the independence war with Georgia 
(Cornell 2001:162). Thus, food production and agricultural activities could quickly resume after 
the war. Secondly, Abkhazia’s landscape makes it possible for the de facto state to obtain all of 
its electricity from hydroelectric plants, making it more energy-independent than Georgia 
proper (ibid.). Thus, after the reconstruction of the destroyed hydroelectric plant, Abkhazia 
could draw most of its energy from inside the country (ICG 2006:17). Moreover, the Black Sea 
coastline has contributed to the economic recovery: After 2001, tourism in the area started 
expanding (O’Loughlin et al. 2011:16); in 2004, the annual tourist count was up to 350,000 
visitors (Coggins 2016:178) and had increased to approximately 700,000 tourists annually by 
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2008 (Gogoryan 2009). Thus, in 2008, Abkhazia had largely recovered from the war. However, 
Abkhazia was heavily dependent on Russia: In 2008, Russia was still the only source of tourism 
and trade, accounting for basically all of Abkhazia’s foreign revenue (ibid.; ICG 2010:6). 
 
2008 and beyond: The years following Russia’s recognition  
The years between 2008 and 2014 were characterised by a strong Abkhaz-Russian 
economic cooperation. Figure 1 shows the amount of Russian aid in billion roubles and as a 
percentage of Abkhazia’s overall state budget. Data for this figure was composed from a 
multitude of sources. Both the aforementioned Hoch, Kopeček and Baar (2017) and O’Loughlin 
et al. (2011) have conducted extensive fieldwork in Abkhazia. This primary data is 
complemented with more economic and academic data by Frear (2014), a regional expert, and 
the International Crisis Group (ICG). 
As evidenced by Figure 1, Abkhazia has retrieved up to 70% and at least 42% of its state 
budget from Russia’s support between 2009 and 2014. In this time period, Russia has provided 
Abkhazia with 1.9bn roubles as direct budgetary support. In 2013, this sum was exceeded with 
an exceptionally high additional aid allocation of 4,9bn roubles provided by Moscow for the 
renewal of Abkhazia’s infrastructure (Frear 2914:6; ICG 2013:6). While the sum of the direct 
budgetary support remained the same in this period, the varying percentages of the aid’s share 
in Abkhazia’s state budget is due to Abkhazia’s rise in overall state revenue after 2009. 
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Up until 2014, Moscow had consistently provided aid to Abkhazia to finance the deficit 
which up until 2014 amounted to 16,3 billion roubles (approx.$211 million) (Khashik 2016). 
Between 2014 and 2016, Russia promised Abkhazia 16,86bn roubles in subsidies (Harding 
2014). However, out of these subsidies, Abkhazia only received 7% by the end of 2015 (Khasik 
2016). 
In 2009, Abkhazian law on property ownership and foreign investments was changed to 
open up Abkhazia to greater foreign investment (O’Loughlin et al. 2011:6). While prior to 2009, 
property leasing and investments could be undertaken by Abkhaz citizens only, the opening-up 
to foreign investment has led to Russian investors building summer holiday homes in Abkhazia, 
boosting the local economy particularly during the summer holiday season (O’Loughlin et al. 
2011:7). Thus, the change of law mainly opened the market towards further Russian, and not 
international investment up until 2011. Since the changing of the law, annual aid allocations 
and infrastructure development programmes have been supplemented with the building of 
schools and institutions by Russian firms, and Russian investment in agriculture (ICG 2013:7). 
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FIGURE 1: RUSSIA'S AID TO ABKHAZIA, IN % OF 
THE STATE BUDGET
% of state budget Aid in bn roubles
(Sources: Frear 2014:6; Hoch, Kopeček and Baar 2017:336; O’Loughlin et al. 2011:6; Comai 2017:8; 
ICG 2010:5; ICG 2013:6; Khasik 2016) 
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Russia accounted for 99% of Abkhazia’s overall foreign trade until 2011 (ICG 2010:6; 
Ekhokavkaza 2012). Nevertheless, other countries have emerged as important economic trading 
partners: 
Turkey hosts a large Abkhaz diaspora of half a million people (Barry 2009). After 2008, 
many Turkish Abkhaz whose parents or grandparents had once fled to Turkey have increasingly 
returned for holidays (Barry 2009). After Russia’s official recognition of Abkhazia, most 
Turkish Abkhaz perceive the risk of a renewed war in Abkhazia as highly unlikely and, thus, 
many expressed the wish to return to Abkhazia sometime in the near future once the Abkhaz 
economy has recovered sufficiently (ibid.).  The legislative change in favour of foreign 
investment in 2009 enabled Turkish investors to establish joint ventures with local Abkhaz 
entrepreneurs, building tourist facilities along the Black Sea coastline (O’Loughlin et al. 
2011:16). Although Turkey does not officially recognise Abkhazia as a country, the trade 
between Abkhazia and Turkey has been developing since 2011 (Figure 2). This trade 
relationship has been solidified by official state visits by Turkish representatives and president 
Bagapsh’s visit to Turkey in 2011, leading to the signing of economic cooperation treaties 
(Frear 2014:10). This has translated into a greater share of foreign trade with Turkey: As figure 
2 shows, in 2012 – a year after the signing of the treaties – Turkey already accounted for 18% 
of Abkhazia’s foreign trade. In 2013, Turkey accounted for 20% of Abkhazia’s foreign trade, 
14% in 2014 and 24% in 2016 4. This shows that the trade relationship with Turkey has 
remained stable at around 20% bar in the year 2017, providing Abkhazia’s with a considerable 
source of income of 2 billion roubles annually (Ministry of Customs of Abkhazia 2016; 
Apsnypress 2013, 2014). 
                                                          
4 no official data is available for 2015, therefore 2015 shall be treated as an estimate 
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Similarly, trade with other countries has been developing since 2011: With the exception 
of the year 2016, trade relationships with other countries have accounted for between 16 and 
26 percent of Abkhazia’s foreign trade after 2011. In 2012, the share of the remaining 18% of 
‘other countries’ included the Baltic countries with 5%, Germany and Moldova with 2%, 
Ukraine and China at 1% (Ekhokavkaza 2012). The Abkhaz Ministry of State Customs reports 
trade relationships with more than 40 countries as of 2018 (Ministry of Customs of Abkhazia 
2018). This proves that Abkhazia has successfully diversified its foreign trade destinations 
starting after 2011, with the share of economic turnover of other countries between 11% in 2011 
and a high of 43% in 2013. 
Furthermore, the trade relationship with China is fortifying since 2017. Previous to 
2017, the trade relationship was solely import-based with Abkhazia acquiring Chinese clothing 
and furniture (Pender 2017). Now, the demand for Abkhaz culinary products such as wine has 
driven new, small-scale Chinese investments in Abkhazia (ibid.). Simultaneously, Chinese 
tourism is rising (ibid.). Similarly to the increasing influx of Turkish and Russian tourists, the 
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FIGURE 2: COUNTRIES ACCOUNTING FOR 
ABKHAZIA'S FOREIGN TRADE, IN %
Russia Turkey other countries
Source: Ekhokavkaza 2012; Apsnypress 2013; Apsnypress 2014; Ministry of Customs of Abkhazia 2016; 
Ministry of Customs of Abkhazia 2018. Data from 2011 is based on author’s calculations. 
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influx of Chinese tourists has been boosted by the troubled situation in other popular holiday 
destinations such as Egypt (Achba 2016) and the financial crisis, which made the cheap resorts 
in the de facto state particularly appealing (Gogoryan 2009). Due to these developments, the 
annual tourists count reached a new high of 1.5 million tourists in 2017 (Pender 2017). 
All these developments have the following implications towards confirming or rejecting 
the hypothesis: Firstly, the assessment has shown that at least until 2014, Abkhazia has 
consistently received financial aid by Moscow (Figure 1). However, after this period, the 
amount of aid received was nowhere near the promised sum. Thus, this point of the hypothesis 
could only be partially confirmed. Regarding the diversification of trade revenues, however, 
the hypothesis was confirmed: After 2011, Abkhazia successfully established trade 
relationships with Turkey and other countries—leading trade with other countries to total 
between 11% and 43% since then—and encouraged tourism and foreign direct investment. 
Although Abkhazia’s dependence on Russia is still considerable, the overall picture certainly 
is one of a changed, more independent economy since 2008. 
 
Step 2: Causal inference 
The descriptive inference has shown that a change in aid and trade relations has, indeed, 
occurred.  To better understand the causal process behind the foreign policy developments, it is 
necessary to revisit the key events assessed in the previous step of the descriptive inference. 
The first step towards greater economic independence was made by establishing trade 
relationships with countries other than Russia. Naturally, this might seem to be a hard 
undertaking due to Abkhazia’s widespread non-recognition which impedes its ability to 
establish official trade relationships with most countries. Nonetheless, Abkhazia succeeded to 
establish relations with several countries: Abkhazia has sought to utilise this Turkish diaspora 
to increase its economic independence from Russia through establishing cooperation treaties 
24 
 
and twinning initiatives with Turkish firms and cities starting from 2012 (Frear 2014:4). 
Moreover, since 2014, Abkhazia has further invested in reaching out to its Turkish as well as 
Syrian diaspora community by providing Turkish and Arab versions of the country’s official 
websites as well as social media accounts (O’Loughlin et al. 2011:16). 
Abkhazia’s efforts to diversify its trade partners was institutionalised with the 
establishment of four distinct departments dedicated to foreign diplomatic and trade relations: 
“(1) the Department of the Russian Federation, the CIS, Nagorny Karabakh, Transnistria, 
Georgia, and South Ossetia; (2) the Department of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Asia-
Pacific; (3) the Department for Europe, the USA, and Canada; and (4) the Department for 
Turkey and the Middle East.” (Frear 2014:86). Positive results have followed from making 
foreign relations a priority. As of 2018, Abkhazia holds 19 diplomatic representative missions 
all over the globe: 3 fully-fledged embassies in Moscow, Caracas and Tskhinval (South 
Ossetia); 8 plenipotentiary representative offices in Berlin, Tiraspol (Transnistria), Sofia, 
Athens, Salonika, Ankara, Damascus and Rome; 3 representative offices of the Foreign 
Ministry of Abkhazia in Amman, Tunis and Vienna; and 3 Honorary Consuls stationed in 
Beijing, London and Rostov-on-Don (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia 
2018). Most of these diplomatic relations were established or expanded in recent years. An 
example of this is the signing of ‘protocols of friendship and cooperation’ with Italian cities in 
2013 and 2014 (Abkhaz World 2014), or the opening of the chamber of commerce to Abkhazia 
in Berlin in 2017 (Morrison 2017). This foreign policy-making process mirrors what Braveboy-
Wagner predicts in her analysis of NSST: The source of a small state’s economic power often 
lies in its economic capacity, or in the ‘smart’ power of establishing strategic diplomatic and 
trading relations (2010:409). Indeed, after Abkhazia’s efforts to establish smart power relations, 
a diversified trade followed. 
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Notwithstanding all the developments regarding foreign relations, it has to be noted that 
Russia still remains the most important trading partner. Thus, ending the enduring dependency 
necessitates strengthening the internal economic capacity of Abkhazia. As Figure 3 and Figure 
4 show, Abkhazia’s trade balance is negative as the imports considerably outweigh the de facto 
state’s exports. While Abkhazia has more than quadrupled its export revenues since 2008, the 
already high amount of import spending has nearly tripled: While Abkhazia is spending 17,85 
billion roubles in 2016 as compared to 6,2 billion roubles in 2008; export revenues have only 
increased from a value of 889 million roubles to 3,59 billion roubles between 2008 and 2016. 
  
Source (Figure 3 and 4): Department of State Statistics of the Republic of Abkhazia 2014, Department 
of State Statistics of the Republic of Abkhazia 2015, Ministry of Customs of Abkhazia 2018 
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FIGURE 3 :  ABKHAZIA'S EXPORT REVENUES,  
IN BILLION ROUBLES
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FIGURE 4 :  ABKHAZIA'S IMPORT SPENDING,  
IN BILLION ROUBLES
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Particularly Russia ceding to deliver aid after 2014 (as seen in the descriptive inference) has 
significantly strengthened Abkhazia’s wish to pursue policies of greater economic 
independence: As a consequence, Abkhazia has sought to drastically change its financial 
policymaking to strengthen its internal economic capacity. In 2016, president Raul Khajimba 
launched reforms to make “Abkhazia self-reliant and the country’s budget unsubsidized” 
(Khajimba in Khashik 2016). These reforms were fourfold:  
(1) Increasing taxes on imported goods to motivate businesses to use local products; this is 
expected to generate a revenue of about one billion roubles in the coming years (Khasik 
2016). In particular, imported beer was taxed with 30 instead of 10 roubles, and tax for 
imported cigarettes rose from 5 to 10 roubles (Apsnypress 2015). 
(2) Increasing the state revenue, mainly through the decriminalisation of the shadow 
economy, which is expected to generate 6 billion roubles once the whole sector is 
decriminalised (Khasik 2016). Moreover, president Khajimba has invested in rebuilding 
the Abkhaz tobacco industry and in the development of the local fishing industry 
(Apsnypress 2015). In addition, loans with subsidised interest rates were granted to local 
businesses (President of Abkhazia 2016a). 
(3) Increase transparency, efficiency and accountability of the state budget and internal 
policymaking processes by establishing a new State Treasury Department, which was 
inaugurated in June 2016 (President of Abkhazia 2016b). 
(4) Decrease the number of state officials; clear figures were not declared, but the number 
of officials has been cut down by 15% in 2016 (Khasik 2016). Partly, this measure was 
aimed at cutting down corruption and ensuring that state personnel was sufficiently 
qualified and motivated (Apsnypress 2017).  
All these reforms are planned to be fully implemented by 2022 (ibid.). Khajimba’s reforms 
showed first positive results in the Abkhaz’ economy the following year: In 2015, budget 
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revenues increased by 18.8% compared to the previous year, and the economy grew by 7.8% 
(Fuller 2016). In 2016, the budget revenue had increased by another 31%, predicted to grow 
another 13% in 2017 (President of Abkhazia 2017).  
The more Abkhazia’s economic and diplomatic capacity grew, the more measures it 
could pursue to further strengthen its economic independence from Russia. Inversely, the 
capacity-building tax and budget reforms of 2016, for instance, would not have been possible 
to conduct in times where Abkhazia’s economy was still week and structurally dependent on 
Russia, particularly between 2008 and 2011. The redevelopment of the domestic manufacturing 
industry and Abkhazia’s growing export trade enabled measures such as the tax increase on 
imported goods, reinforcing its striving for national economic autonomy. Moreover, as 
predicted by Braveboy-Wagner (2010:409), the fact that Abkhazia has valuable energy 
resources through its hydroelectric plants has provided the de facto state with a favourable 
precondition for increased economic independence.  
A timetable of the described events will help depict the causal process:  
 
Figure 5 shows the process of the foreign policy change: The peak of Abkhazia’s 
economic reliance can be identified as the period between 2008 and 2011, demonstrated, for 
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instance, by the fact that Russia accounted for about 99% of Abkhazia’s foreign investment in 
this period (ICG 2010). Moreover, the Abkhaz economy had yet to recover from the long-term 
effects of the war with Georgia (Coggins 2014:176). The period between 2011 and 2014 can be 
assessed as a transition period: Abkhazia is slowly diversifying its foreign trade revenues due 
to the growing cooperation with Turkey: Turkish tourist flows after 2010 have been followed 
by Turkish investments in the region (made possible by the change in property law in 2009), 
eventually leading to the signing of cooperation treaties between Turkey and Abkhazia (Barry 
2009; Frear 2014:4; O’Loughlin et al. 2011:16). Similarly, cooperation accords between Italian 
and Abkhaz cities have been established since 2013 (Abkhaz World 2014). After 2014, a 
foreign and trade policy increasingly independent from Russia can be observed through the 
strengthening of trade relationships with other countries such as China, but also many other 
countries which now host representative offices to Abkhazia (Pender 2017). Moreover, concrete 
measures to attract foreign investment and to strengthen Abkhazia’s internal economic 
capabilities have been conducted, most notably the tax and budgetary reforms launched in 2016. 
This identification of distinct phases will allow for the analysis of which domestic factors have 
been accountable for the change towards greater independence. 
To provide a complete NSST analysis which assesses both possible domestic 
determinants of foreign policy change, this analysis will also test for the individual level of 
policy change suggested by Fredrick Doeser. Leaders are assumed to be the initiators of foreign 
policy change; this foreign policy change will succeed if other domestic variables are 
favourable (Doeser 2013:583). The following analysis will, thus, be concerned with the 
question whether any of Abkhazia’s leaders’ wish towards greater independence was the 
initiator of the change in foreign policy, or whether the individual level of analysis is not salient 
for this case study. 
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A timeline of Abkhaz leadership is indispensable for this analysis: 
Figure 6 shows that Abkhazia saw a change in political leadership three times since 
2008. This timetable reveals that the peak of Abkhazia’s independence coincides with former 
president Sergei Bagapsh’s presidency. Bagapsh had already been in office since 2005, and was 
re-elected in 2008.  
In the first years following the official Russian recognition, Abkhazia’s key political 
and societal figures knew that a strong cooperation with Russia was necessary to consolidate 
the separation from Georgia. Hoch, Kopeček and Baar conducted “interviews with important 
local non-state actors” (2017:332) from Abkhaz civil society, news agencies and key clerical 
and secular institutions in 2009, 2014 and 2015. Just after Russia’s official recognition of 
Abkhazia in 2008, most interviewees stated that Russia’s financial assistance was, for now, 
indispensable to acquire the necessary funds to strengthen the internal democratic structures 
and economy (ibid:335). However, the same civil society leaders recognised that once this had 
been done, Abkhazia ought to pursue greater independence from Russia (ibid.:336). This 
opinion was echoed in the Abkhaz policymaking realm with president Bagapsh declaring that 
his government was determined to make Abkhazia more independent from Russia 
(Sputniknews 2009). However, the domestic conditions were evidently not favourable for such 
a change to happen yet, as a gradual change in economic and foreign policy only occurred after 
his presidency ended. 
The financial policy-making transition between 2011 and 2014 coincides with the term 
of president Alexander Ankvab who governed from May 2011 and resigned in June 2014. 
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Notably, he resigned as a consequence of public riots; protesters dissented with the fact that 
Ankvab had not been committed towards Abkhazia’s greater financial independence, for 
instance by not tackling corruption and promoting better fiscal management sufficiently 
(Herszenhorn 2014). Hence, during Ankvab’s presidency, necessary domestic conditions 
towards a change in financial policymaking can be found: The recovering economy, the 
establishment of the trade relationship with Turkey, and the public opinion favourable of such 
a change. However, Ankvab never expressed a commitment toward greater financial 
independence from Russia: On the contrary, he frequently met Russia’s president Putin, voicing 
a desire for greater cooperation between the two countries (President of Russia 2013). Thus, 
albeit a window of opportunity to increase economic independence was present, a change in 
economic foreign policy did not follow due to Ankvab’s lack of commitment. After his 
resignation, Valeri Bganba took on the role as the acting president for a period of three months 
before presidential elections could be called. 
During Khajimba’s presidency from 2014 onwards we see the greatest commitment 
towards increased financial independence: The solidification of diplomatic and trade 
relationships through the establishment of representative offices in many parts of the world, the 
establishment of the Abkhaz Chamber of Commerce in Berlin and, most importantly, 
Khajimba’s tax and budget reforms from 2016 onwards. Khajimba’s tax reform, thus far, is the 
only manifestation of the wish for greater financial independence by an Abkhaz’ president. This 
suggests that in this case, Khajimba was the initiator of Abkhazia’s gradual financial policy 
change. As suggested by Doeser’s leader-driven change approach, the implementation of 
Khajimba’s wish for greater financial independence was made possible by a window of 
opportunity: the recovering Abkhaz economy, the increased export revenues and the 
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increasingly high number of trade relationships favoured the full implementation of his tax 
reforms.  
 
Conclusion: 
This research has concluded that domestic factors have empowered Abkhazia to steer 
its financial foreign policy according to its preference of a greater financial independence from 
Russia. With this, this analysis has verified the expectations of neoliberal small state theory 
applied to this case study. This was shown by the fact that Abkhazia was able to implement a 
more independent foreign policy over the years, particularly since 2014. Two domestic factors, 
in particular, were verified by this research to have caused this development: Firstly, congruent 
to Braveboy-Wagner’s claim, Abkhazia’s increasing economic capability and its ‘smart’ power 
to form trading relationships with an increasing number of states. Secondly, Abkhazia’s 
leadership as an influential domestic factor to steer this process. As argued by Doeser, a change 
in foreign policy can be induced by the leaders of small states and can be fully implemented 
when a window of opportunity is given. Abkhaz president Khajimba’s commitment towards 
greater financial independence, paired with an already favourable economic and diplomatic 
environment at the time of his presidency, appears to have led to a successfully implemented 
change in financial foreign policy-making. Thus, the findings of this analysis have validated 
small state theory as an appropriate framework for Abkhazia. The implications for NSST: NSST 
is an appropriate analytical framework for de facto states.  
The implications for the study of de facto states are the following: Albeit generalisation 
can rarely happen based on a single case study, this research nonetheless hopes to have laid the 
foundation for future research: This analysis has shown that de facto states can serve as the 
research object for both subfields of small state theory. Therefore, this research has contributed 
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towards the establishment of small state theory as a possible explanatory mechanism onto other 
de facto case studies. Albeit the domestic level of analysis within NSST might not be equally 
applicable to every de facto state, small state theory literature and its two different sub-
approaches hold valuable insights for the analysis of de facto states: For case studies in which 
the domestic approach is not feasible, the systemic/classical small state theory approach might 
provide an alternative analytical framework instead. Thus, this thesis hopes to have contributed 
towards the advancement of a generalisable theory – small state theory – which could bridge a 
multitude of case studies, allowing for comparative case studies in the future. 
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